PART ONE: INTRODUCTION
Emissions trading (ET) is an important regulatory instrument to address climate change because it is said to be efficient, effective, and equitable. 1 While all three claims are subject to criticism, this paper uses the European Emissions Trading Scheme's (ETS) regulatory failures as a case study because it is the first of its kind and provides valuable policy lessons for ET programs elsewhere. 2 Specifically, industry lobbying for free European Union Allowances (EUA) in phase one (2005) (2006) (2007) and phase two (2008-2012) has been criticised for creating windfall profits benefiting electricity generators (generators) and raising electricity prices for both domestic consumers and energy intensive industries (EIIs). However, phase three (2013-2020) allocation rules require 100 per cent auctioning for most generators and free permits for some EIIs. Table Two below explains that phases one and two were the product of the same directive and consultation process. Phase one is now complete which provides a rich source of empirical evidence and academic literature. Phase three, however, was subject to a separate directive and consultation process. References to phases one and three throughout this paper also refer to their enabling directives unless otherwise specifically stated.
The puzzle is: what explains the change in permit allocation rules between ETS phases one and three? In particular, as actor preferences have not significantly changed and most private interest theories of regulation predict the static dominance of producer interests at the expense of diffuse cost-bearing publics, why did this shift take place? This paper will argue that Wilson's politics of regulation Typology is more applicable to EU policymaking than private interest theories and that, within EU policymaking, a shift has taken place that is consistent with a movement that Wilson would typify as a change from client politics to interest group politics. 3 This Wilsonian shift usefully explains the change in EUA allocation rules between ETS phases one and three.
The ETS is an interesting case study because it demonstrates the possibility of policy shifts that can be captured within the terms of Wilson's Typology. Such changes, moreover, can be tracked evidentially. The ETS consultation process for phases one and three directives was transparent. All lobbying positions are available on the EU Commission's (commission) website. Regulatory failures are defined as: 'a regulation with a purpose to improve the world but which fails to produce a net benefit to society' in C. Sunstein, 'Paradoxes of the Regulatory State ' (1990) (New York: Basic Books, 1980) . one, but formed the Alliance of Energy Intensive Industries (AEII) in phase three. Comparing the positions of these associations with the original commission proposals and final directives in both phases allows, with certain assumptions, for the identification of lobbying winners and losers. The results of this analysis will then be matched with Wilson's typological descriptions to show that his theory provides a better explanation for the change in allocation rules.
As Wilson predicted greatest rent-seeking with client politics, conclusions will assess the prospects of ETS reflecting optimal policy prescriptions. 4 These conclusions may be of significance to policymakers designing American, Australian, and global ET schemes.
PART TWO: UNDERSTANDING ALLOCATIONS
Relatively few scholars have applied private interest theories to ET schemes, and even fewer have used Wilson's Typology. The literature also struggles to explain changes in allocation rules between phases. Although some scholars apply Wilson's Typology to analyse American SO2 trading and ETS phase one, to date none have applied Wilson's Typology to phase three's final EUA allocation. 5 While a number of authors have explained free over-allocation of EUAs in phase one, none predicted the windfall profits of generators or considered potential changes in allocation methods after 2012. 6 This section will assess the relevance of private interest theories to this topic, particularly their applicability to EU policymaking and their ability to explain regulatory change. The case will then be made for using Wilson's approach instead.
PRIVATE INTEREST THEORIES AND EMISSIONS TRADING

Private interest theories and the policymaking process
Private interest theories all highlight the risks of capture caused by information asymmetry and revolving door career paths. 7 While modern versions of these theories now explain business preference for ET, historically they predicted the dominance of command and control regulation. 8 Both analyses point to potential rent-seeking with either instrument resulting from Hayek's 'knowledge problem' of insurmountable informational asymmetries. 9 More recently, scholars have signalled the importance of market-based instruments (MBI) like carbon taxes or ET to reduce this asymmetry and discourage 'revolving door' career paths that contribute to capture. By choosing ET instead of best available technology mandates, or cap and trade systems rather than baseline and credit approaches, asymmetry and the potential for capture is reduced. 10 Despite the theoretical foundations of various private interest approaches, there exists little empirical evidence to support either capture or revolving-door careers. 11 Government failure has also been criticised as a myth. 12 There are two dominant schools of private interest theories, each with different assumptions about actor motivation. The Chicago school of law and economics believes legislators and regulators seek to maximise their personal wealth. Virginian public choice scholars assume that in addition to financial interests, these actors are motivated by electoral and ideological gains. In both models, regulatees seek to extract rents (excess profits) caused by government intervention in the economy (eg limiting competition by awarding monopolies or creating other barriers to market entry). 13 Despite the strong empirical evidence for private interest theories, they have been criticised for a lack of applicability to EU policymaking and a failure to adequately explain policy change. 7 Defined as when: 'vested interests bias the incentives of regulators and governments to act in their interests rather than the broader public interest'. See D. Helm, 'Regulatory Reform, Capture and the Regulatory Burden' (2006) 
The limits of private interest theories
1. EU policymaking Foster reveals the challenges of applying Chicagoan and Virginian theories to EU policymaking through his analysis of network industry ownership in Britain. 14 In rejecting a Chicagoan explanation for nationalisation, he describes the centrality of pork-barrel lobbying to Chicagoan models. 15 The Chicagoan approach is therefore more applicable to political systems like America with liberal campaign finance laws, weak political parties, and first-past the post-electoral systems, a combination rarely found in Europe. 16 Following an intergovernmentalist approach to EU policymaking, member states, and therefore European institutions, are less exposed to Chicagoan arguments. 17 For example, the EU Parliament (parliament) cannot initiate legislation and is elected by proportional representation, and other EU institutions are not directly elected. Parliament also operates by consensus through transnational groupings and is therefore less exposed to capture in the Chicagoan sense. 18 This likely explains why parliament has always favoured EUA auctioning. 19 At first glance, Virginian explanations are more convincing. However, following a supranationalist argument, the commission dominates and is the locus for most lobbying activity. 20 It seeks neither electoral nor ideological gains in the Virginian sense because it is an unelected bureaucracy. The commission is not motivated by ideology but by Brussels empire-building, jurisdictional expansionism, and budget maximisation through regulation. 21 Authors have highlighted the growth and domination of interest group activity by corporate interests in Brussels and how the commission gives insider status to business and funds groups -non-governmental organisations (NGOs) -that provide informational support for its agenda of European integration. 22 This provides a severe challenge to private interest theories because it reverses the direction of capture. Part Four will discuss evidence of this in ETS phase three. 14 C. Foster, 'Rival Explanations of Public Ownership, Its Failure and Privatization' (1994) 
Explaining policy change
The Chicago school struggles to explain policy change more than other regulatory theories. 23 If regulation is a function of client politics (see Table One ), then what explains policy reversals that reduce rents like full EUA auctioning? 24 While Chicagoans such as Peltzman, Keeler, and Noll have argued that endogenous processes of 'rent dissipation' cause shifts to deregulation, evidence of this phenomenon is patchy. 25 In addition, no risk of windfall profit dissipation exists for generators because the industry is not exposed to global competition. Virginian theories better explain change because the utility functions of politicians are broader; they are motivated by ideological gains and shifting voter preferences. 26 Therefore, electoral backlashes (against producer dominance) or 'new ideas' are endogenous to Virginian theory and can explain deregulation. 27 While other regulatory theories such as pluralism and institutionalism are important to understand policy dynamism, a discussion of them is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, the following analysis will consider the dominant literature: public choice application to ETS phase one. 28 Public choice application to emissions trading Most literature applies public choice to ET because it reveals the risks of regulatory failure. Unless planners have sufficient incentives to act on and acquire the necessary information to correct market failures, it is a 'nirvana fallacy' to assume that politics can fix markets. 29 Political markets are mired with transaction costs and collective action problems that generate client politics equilibriums. 30 The rational ignorance of voters provides little incentive for monitoring or mobilising against rent-seeking by small, wealthy, organised lobby groups. 31 Politicians and bureaucrats are monopolists in their domains and have strong incentives to make short-term gains through rent distribution and to empire-build with clientelist 23 coalitions. 32 Such has been the strength of rent-seeking in both America and Australia that ET programs have failed to clear legislative hurdles in both countries (see the section on Policy implications below). Indeed, America has abandoned the more efficient economy-wide cap and trade program in favour of a sectoral approach, with ET primarily for electric utilities. 33 Public choice literature defines the self-interests of large emitters (large electricity generators, EIIs), politicians, environmental NGOs (ENGOs), and bureaucrats in a consistent way. Generally speaking, large emitters are profit maximisers with goals to minimise climate policy costs and/or gain additional rents. This explains their preference for ET compared to carbon taxes. 34 Within this group, large electricity producers in Europe and America favour grandfathered permits. 35 Elected politicians (parliament and council) are assumed to be risk-averse opportunists with a primary objective of re-election. 36 ENGOs have historically focused on targets and not policy instruments because they raise funds through easily understandable campaigns. 37 However, significant literature exists analysing the preference and opposition of ENGOs to MBIs and ET in particular. 38 Bureaucrats (commission) prefer instruments that allow discretionary decisions, require negotiation and are based on special information needs. This allows them to empire-build by budget-raising, to link climate policy with other growth areas, and to play a central role in implementation. 39 It also demonstrates a bias towards the conservatism of command and control regulation. 40 These defined interests allow public choice theory to identify whether groups are winners or losers in political markets. Markussen and Svenden identified winners and losers for Directive one, while Wettestad did so for Commission Proposal Two (see Table Two for details of these documents). 41 With these interests in mind, public choice theory has made a number of predictions that have been confirmed by empirical evidence to explain why ET is counterproductive and deviates from economic prescriptions. 42 For example, public choice predicts that the preferences of small, powerful, cohesive industry lobbies will be reflected in permit allocation rules (free grandfathering) and abatement levels (lower). Empirically, the American SO2 trading scheme and the ETS evidenced this phenomenon. 43 At an international level, business preferences are reflected in the Kyoto Protocol Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism. 44 The large gap between the ambition of international agreements and the reality of domestic implementation can also be explained by the relatively greater strength of climate protection interests at the international level. 45 Finally, the divergence between mandatory ET legislation in Europe and America or Australia can be partly explained by the commission's self-interest in institutionalising the ETS. 46 While these failures cannot be disputed, ETS phase three is an improvement on phase one. Public choice struggles to explain this phenomenon because actor preferences have not significantly changed (see Case Study Analysis below). The commission always favoured auctioning, and industry always preferred free permits. Even while EIIs objected to generator windfall profits they favoured free allocation for themselves and demanded compensation for higher energy prices. EURELECTRIC also begrudgingly accepted auctioning in phase three (see Table Six in Appendix One). Wilson's Typology and derived literature provide a better analytical framework for explaining different allocation rules. This last discussion will complete the literature review.
WILSON'S TYPOLOGY
Wilson's Typology is a political rather than economic explanation for regulation. It complements public choice theory by providing a profile for successful rent-seeking groups instead of simply assuming regulation is demanded and obtained. 47 Wilson's theory does not explain how benefits materialise because unlike Virginians and Chicagoans, Wilson ignores the consideration for regulatory bargains. 48 The Typology therefore suffers from a critique of generality, but is also more applicable to EU policymaking. The essence of Wilson's argument is that the distribution of regulatory costs and benefits is central to predicting rent-seeking levels. Wilson's Typology also provides roles for policy entrepreneurs, force of ideas, and other political explanations for regulatory change, because costs and benefits are not exclusively monetary. The importance of economic interests differs throughout Wilson's theory. 49 Wilson's Typology describes four politics of regulation. When benefits of regulation are concentrated and costs are dispersed, client politics (the Chicagoan original sin) emerges with very high levels of rent-seeking because cost-bearers face high barriers to collective action due to group size. 50 The general public (often cost-bearers) may not be aware of clientelist regulation because negotiations are usually opaque. However, NGOs are now important checks on this phenomenon.
Less favourable conditions for rent-seeking are expected in the following three circumstances. Firstly, when costs and benefits of regulation are concentrated, interest group politics emerges, meaning that regulation will benefit one group at the expense of another. Each side has an incentive to organise and exercise political influence with less rent-seeking resulting. While the public may sympathise with one group over another, its voice only is heard in general terms. In the second circumstance, costs and benefits are both dispersed, and all or most of society expects to both gain and pay. As such, both opponents and proponents of regulation may find it difficult to organise. A majoritarian politics will therefore emerge only when popular sentiment and elite opinions are convinced of regulatory benefits. Lastly, entrepreneurial politics occurs when the benefits of regulation are dispersed but the costs are concentrated. In this situation, opponents have strong incentives to block regulation. Yet even Wilson observed how policy entrepreneurs can mobilise latent public support despite collective action challenges. Wilson provides little explanation for shifts in his typology except for the possibility of entrepreneurial politics. He believes policy entrepreneurs are facilitated by crises and by the discovery of electoral ore from regulation that benefits scattered groups at the expense of narrow ones. 59 Keeler, Bendor, and Moe make this argument to explain deregulation. 60 However, Wilson is unclear as to whether entrepreneurial politics means blank slate regulation (new) or changes to regulation formed in client or interest politics equilibriums to reflect a new alignment of costs and benefits. His rather static view of cost-benefit distribution suggests the former, and therefore Wilson does not explain how regulation escapes the iron grip of client politics.
A small but fascinating body of scholarship develops Wilson's Typology to explain these changes; some of which was canvassed above (see Explaining policy change). Hood divides the literature between exogenous (force of ideas) and endogenous (interest group) explanations, although as discussed above, ideas are not necessarily exogenous to Wilson's model. For example, the very prescriptive success of Chicagoan theories may have undermined their descriptive accuracy through exogenous new ideas (regulatory failure) which facilitated shifts from client to entrepreneurial politics. 61 Adding to Peltzman and Keeler's endogenous arguments analysed above, Hood describes a 'lose-to-win' strategy adopted by AT&T in accepting deregulation for access to new markets. 62 Also, countermobilisation occurred when corporate consumers lobbied for deregulation of telecommunications markets to lower costs and compete with other financial centres. However, Hood explains that counter-mobilisation cuts both ways and can cause a shift back from entrepreneurial to client politics. 63 The tendency of client politics to self-destruct may also explain shifts to interest group equilibriums, although very little literature explores this point. The case study analysis in Part Four below explores this self-destructive pattern in the ETS.
New scholarship provides explanations for the rise and sustainability of general interest reforms. 64 Patashnik surveys the literature and outlines three conditions for adoption: (1) policy entrepreneurs must lower information costs to mass publics by linking reform solutions to salient issues (eg by linking ET to GHG mitigation policy); (2) reform proponents must adopt procedural strategies to weaken the organisational advantages of narrow groups (eg by developing expert knowledge or changing committees structures); and lastly (3) reform advocates must use tactical concessions to neutralise political opposition (eg by providing free permits). 65 Patashnik then argues that general interest reforms are most resilient when they upset coalitional patterns and stimulate the emergence of new vested interests and political alliances. This last point is significant because one of the advantages of ET compared to carbon taxes is that the former is easier to implement politically because policymakers can pay-off opponents and create new political constituencies that have a stake in ET programs. 66 However, somewhat paradoxically, this virtue can be a vice if rent-seeking is so strong that stakeholders lose faith in ET, resulting in a failure to implement in the first place. This phenomenon is currently being observed in both America and Australia.
In light of the literature, this paper addresses the following puzzle: what explains the different EUA allocation rules for generators and EIIs between ETS phases one and three? The proposed and tested hypothesis is: a shift can be seen in Wilson's Typology, as one from client politics to interest group politics. This shift explains the change in allocation rules.
PART THREE: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE EU ETS
The ETS is the cornerstone of EU climate policy. Launched in 2005, it is the first cross-border greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) trading scheme and regulates more than 11,500 installations or about 45 per cent of total EU CO2 emissions. 67 (5) Science and Public Policy 329, 338; n 2 above. For example, carbon markets create a powerful and rapidly growing set of vested financial interests with strong incentives to lobby for the continuation of the ETS. Also, ring-fencing auctioning revenues for renewable energy projects create new political constituencies. 67 Egenhofer, n 46 above, 453. directive (Directive One) that enabled both these phases fell under the co-decision mechanism and entered into force on 13 October 2003. 68 It was legislated after the Council of Ministers (council) unanimously modified Commission Directive One, along with a very large majority in parliament. 69 Directive One was the result of rigorous commission consultations with stakeholders. The Green Paper provided the reference for this. In only a few cases did the commission express explicit preferences (see Table Six below in Appendix One). 70 Article 30 of Directive One required that the commission submit a report to parliament and council before extending the directive the Kyoto Protocol expires (phase three: 2013-2020). 71 The report assessed ETS performance and concluded the need for a review. This gave rise to a number of position papers and studies by stakeholders with further consultations within the European Climate Change Program (ECCP). The ECCP established a working group on the review and produced final reports incorporated into a commission communication. 72 Membership of the working group was comprised of member states, industry, NGOs, academia, and research institutes. These consultations formed the basis of a second commission directive (Commission Directive Two). 73 It was modified into Directive Two, which was adopted unanimously by the council with only 60 votes against and 29 abstentions in parliament. 74 Directive Two entered into force on 5 June 2009. Table Two (2009) Multiple purposes prevent labelling ETS phase one an overall regulatory failure. ETS phase one was a trial period with a goal to ensure European leadership promoting global cost-effective climate policy instruments. 78 This leadership component has been accomplished; however, a complete regulatory success would have resulted in the absence of both windfall profits and over-allocation. 79 This is significant because ETS phase three will not require 100 per cent EUA auctioning. The potential for regulatory failure still exists. As a result, many commentators propose a carbon tax as an alternative policy tool because it is less susceptible to rent-seeking and provides price stability. 80 The next section presents the evidence and indentifies winners and losers in both ETS phases. 
EVIDENCE ANALYSED
The industries analysed are limited to large electricity generators and EIIs. It is clear from the literature review that generators on balance won in phase one, while EIIs won in phase three. 81 This paper seeks to explain the reasons for this change.
The positions of individual firms and NGOs are also not analysed. 82 Instead, the interests of large generators are reflected in EURELECTRIC's positions. The AEII represented 12 energy intensive industrial sectors (most EIIs) in phase three but not phase one. A full list is found in Appendix Two. The AEII was created after the relative failure of its members' lobbying and previous weaker umbrella groups' efforts (UNICE, IFIEC) in phase one.
The lobbying positions of EURELECTRIC and the AEII in phases one and three are represented in Tables Four and Five. Table Six 
IDENTIFYING WINNERS AND LOSERS
Adding to the findings of Markussen and Svendsen, Tables Four, Five and Six indicate that phase one did not produce absolute winners despite some sectors faring better than others. 83 All industrial sectors wanted a voluntary system, which Directive One rejected. Only chemical and aluminium industries successfully lobbied for exclusion. They claimed the ETS would affect their ability to compete internationally. Free grandfathered EUAs are an example of cross-sectoral success particularly when compared to auctioning. However, the divisions of AEII members on this issue are glaring. It may explain their inability to oppose allocation and banking decisions left to member states which created the competitiveness problems discussed above in the first section of Part Three 84 Generators on the other hand favoured national allocations because it allowed consideration (ie lobbying) of national differences in reduction potential, despite their numerous cheap options for CO2 reductions compared to EIIs. 85 Finally, by 81 All interviews; Gullberg, n 58 above; Wettestad, n 5 above; EndsReport 'Trading Down to a LowCarbon Economy' (2009) avoiding auctioning, generators reaped windfall profits. The fact that EIIs did not identify this issue, promote auctioning for generators, or obtain compensation for higher energy prices is further evidence that generators fared better than most EIIs in phase one. Markussen and Svendsen attribute this success to generators being the largest and most important sector for implementation. 86 Like phase one, phase three did not produce absolute winners; however, Table Seven demonstrates EURELECTRIC did not receive the lions' share of concessions. The electricity industry gained only one important victory in Directive Two -that of optional derogations for generators in Poland and the Baltic. This is limited to a high percentage of fossil fuel generation and interconnectivity with Russian energy alternatives (see Article 10(c) in Table Seven ). Despite the apparent coup, it is not attributable to EURELECTRIC's position. Instead it reflects the unique characteristics of these domestic energy markets and the symbolic goal of political unanimity at the council for Poznan Conference of the Parties (COP) 14. 87 It is a mere 'fig leaf' according to one EU insider because the qualifying threshold for derogations is very high. 88 AEIIs on the other hand, received every concession except one -that of regulating electricity costs (see Table Seven ). However, Directive Two, Article 10(a) allows member states to compensate industries for GHG cost pass-through, with admittedly very strict benchmarks. This is nevertheless an improvement on Commission Proposal Two, which omitted the issue. The AEIIs also improved Commission Proposal Two by increasing the number of small installations excluded from the ETS and adding a qualitative criterion to the methodology for identifying industries at risk of carbon leakage. 89 Wettestad and Gullberg both argue that when analysed through the lens of industry differentiation, it is clear that EURELECTRIC won in phase one, and AEIIs won in phase three. 90 The next and final section will attempt to provide a theoretical framework for explaining this change in winners and losers between phases one and three using Wilson's Typology.
PART FOUR: CASE STUDY ANALYSIS
THE EXPLANATORY FORCE OF WILSON'S TYPOLOGY
This paper seeks to understand: why different EUA allocations rules were adopted in ETS phases one and three. As addressed in Part Two above, most private interest theories struggle to provide an explanation of this shift because actor constellations and their interests have not significantly changed. Yet the ETS case study identified generators as lobbying winners in phase one, while EIIs won in phase three. The hypothesis defended here is that a shift from client to interest group politics from phase one to phase three explains this change. Before testing and drawing inferences from this hypothesis, two questions must be addressed: (1) do the case study facts fit with Wilson's Typology? and (2) why did interest group politics not emerge in phase one?
On balance, evidence for phase one fits with Wilson's description of client politics. Small, well-organised generators successfully secured free EUAs and passed-on their nominal costs to diffused domestic consumers, generating significant windfall profits. However, two facts do not fit this model: (1) allocation rules were transparently devised; and (2) powerful EIIs could have ensured the emergence of interest group politics. Wilson envisaged client politics as one of 'backstairs intrigue, quiet lobbying, and quick passage with a minimum public discussion'. 92 Nothing about the ETS legislative process is further from that expectation. Also, public interest arguments about climate change mitigation are the reason for these directives, which Wilson believed would require 'more elaborate justifications-and thereby mobilize a more extensive coalition'. 93 The other three politics envisage greater transparency or at least some public knowledge of the rents being lobbied for. This is because majoritarian politics require public support for adoption, while entrepreneurial politics require policy entrepreneurs to mobilise latent public sentiment. Interest group politics expect a lukewarm public whose voices are heard in 'weak or general terms'. 94 Consequently, while the case study evidence prevents any serious characterisation of phase one as either majoritarian or entrepreneurial politics, it does present the following question: why did interest group politics not emerge in the first place? 92 n 3 above, 369. 93 ibid, 370. 94 ibid, 368.
As discussed in Part Two, Cook has characterised phase one as interest group politics. 95 He concludes that evidence of interest group competition fits Wilson's prediction because something in the 'final legislation please [d] each affected party'. 96 These points are difficult to dispute. However, resulting windfall profits for generators do not fit with lower rent-seeking expectations of interest group politics, nor does the fact that eventual ET regulatory costs are borne by all carbon-intensive consumers (not just EIIs). Rather, these facts fit with client politics. Moreover, if interest group politics emerged in phase one, why did the allocation rules change in phase three? This form of politics expects only marginal changes due to fierce competition.
Cook's analysis overlooks at least three important factors that help explain why interest group politics did not emerge in phase one: (1) the windfall profit mechanism was not widely understood or made transparent by generators; (2) EIIs were divided and not well-organised; and (3) the legislative process was rushed with steep learning curves for most involved. Each of these factors will be discussed in turn.
Ellerman and Joskow argue that 'the effects of the ETS on wholesale and retail power prices and generator profitability when the sector was being liberalized were not widely understood '. 97 This is supported by the fact that no reference to potential windfall profits exists in the very comprehensive Green Paper. 98 On the other hand, greater profitability for low-carbon generators (nuclear, hydro) in liberalised markets was expected because wholesale market prices reflect EUA values. However, these installations received few or no permits. 99 In addition, not everyone at the commission understood the risk of windfall profits. The DG Enterprise and Industry, whose stakeholders are the EIIs, remained unaware of this risk until late in the negotiation process. Only through piecing together evidence about price interaction with marginal power plants did EIIs become aware of windfall profits risks. 100 Individual interviews suggest that in hindsight, 'the commission was naïve to not recognize why EURELECTRIC supported the ETS'. 101 On the other hand, the DG Environment was 'probably aware' as an official there argues that: windfall profits were understood from a textbook perspective only. The commission did not understand how it worked in practice. For example, which firms are price makers or takers and how it would equalize across sectors or how liberalization would put a downward pressure on this phenomenon […] competitiveness was the most important issue for lobbyists in phase one, not windfall profits. 102 The DG Energy and Transport was most aware of this risk, because their stakeholders are the generators, but all interviewees persist that requiring higher auctioning levels for generators 'was part of the compromise required for implementation '. 103 Generators likely understood they would benefit from windfall profits. EURELECTRIC carried out ET simulations in 1999 and 2000 where its members presumably learned about windfall profits. 104 An official at EDF confirms this and acknowledges that generators anticipated windfall profits. 105 However, another official at the same company argues that 'free allocations were introduced primarily to minimize the competitiveness impacts on coal rather than nuclear generators'. 106 EIIs were not well-organised in phase one. Markussen and Svendsen draw this conclusion as do Engenhofer and Wettestad. 107 Wettestad argues that 'they woke up and got their ETS act together' after phase one, becoming more knowledgeable, united and improving their standing within the commission. 108 This is evidenced by their role in establishing and dominating the High Level Group 109 , their active participation in the ECCP 110 meetings, and their multitargeted lobbying drive in phase three. 111 All three activities ensured the impossibility of ignoring windfall profits and carbon leakage. In contrast, during phase one ECCP meetings, EIIs were uncoordinated and partly disagreed amongst themselves. One observer likened it to 'having slept in class'. 112 This conclusion is also strengthened by the EII's divisions in Tables Four and Five and the frequency  of AEII press releases after Directive One was legislated (more than 10 were issued after January 2004 and none before that date). 113 ETS phase one was a quick policy-making process guided by the principle of implementability where groups with knowledge and experience with ET had stronger lobbying power. After the withdrawal of America from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, the commission embarked on a learning, consultation, and implementation sprint to establish the ETS in four years. This was part of its strategy to replace America as climate change policy leader. 114 Phase one ECCP meetings were dominated by generators because they provided the commission with information on how ET worked. 115 Officials interviewed at the commission all posit that phase one was a trial period; the most important goal was to get things started because it triggers a learning process and institutionalises the regime. Avoiding the American fate, where business blocked mandatory carbon regulation, was high on policymakers' minds. 116 Confronting lobby groups on allocation methods risked closing the commission's implementation window. It also would have detracted from the herculean tasks of technical forecasting and data collection necessary for market creation and to negotiate National Allocation Plans. 117 The core of Wilson's argument is that the distribution of costs and benefits of regulation explains levels of rent-seeking. While ETS phase one had all the characteristics of being an example of an interest group battle, it appears from this case study that costs and benefits do not operate in a vacuum. They need to be transparently understood, and interest groups also need time to mobilise. In this sense, there are informational costs and transaction costs to collective action that provide certain interest groups with lobbying advantages. These costs can be significant and explain why Wilson's Typology does not always match the empirical reality. Nevertheless, this insight fits with Wilson's typology if regulatory costs and benefits are conceived of more broadly to include: transaction, informational, agency, and collective action costs and benefits.
In summary, although phase one does not neatly fit in either client or interest group politics, the argument presented here is that client politics arguments are strongest. The next section will analyse whether phase three corresponds with Wilson's description of interest group politics. 113 See press releases in Appendix Two below. 114 A.C. Christiansen and J. Wettestad, 'The EU as Frontrunner on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading: How Did it Happen and Will the EU Succeed?' (2003) 
EXPLAINING SHIFTS: CAN REGULATORY FAILURES BE CORRECTED?
ETS phase three can be characterised as interest group politics because the final legislation pleased each affected party and resulted from competition between active and knowledgeable interest groups. 118 For instance, EURELECTRIC remained very active but understood windfall profits would end after phase two although it did not endorse auctioning. Instead, its achieved message was that other sectors should not unduly benefit from free allocations. 119 As in phase one, the process was transparent, but this time public opinion clearly sided with EIIs because global competition risks and public outrage over higher energy prices, with corresponding profits, received headlines. 120 The level of overall rent-seeking in phase three matches interest group politics expectations: auctioning removes windfall profits for generators, and the exceptions for facilities in Eastern Europe use strict benchmarks, while the free-allocations for EIIs are also very restrictive.
At present, the impacts of ET policies are understood by broad constituencies, and the first signs of entrepreneurial or majoritarian politics may be appearing. The allocation rules are moving towards optimal policy prescriptions which disperse both costs and benefits of regulation (Wilson's majoritarian politics). As such, consumers pay the final costs, and no industry unduly benefits. Nevertheless, this majoritarian equilibrium is taking an entrepreneurial route because, depending on which EIIs qualify for free EUAs in phase three, some may bear the complete cost of regulation while all dispersed consumers may benefit from lower emissions. The ETS will eventually become majoritarian. However, this prospect is likely longer-term because full carbon-cost internalisation (with costs born fully by carbon-intensive consumers) is only expected if and when carbon targets tighten through 2020 and beyond. Also, future generations (not current cost-bearers) will benefit from climate stability if targets are overshot. 121 Other than the greater organisation, cohesion, and resources of EIIs, ETS case study facts in phase three match the theoretical explanations for shifts away from client politics surveyed in the literature review (see Part Two above). For example, exogenous shifts in the form of global competition raised the profile of carbon leakage facing EIIs. 122 Indeed, Wettestad argues that windfall profits on their own did not justify different allocation rules between industries. 123 Rather, it was the combination with fears of carbon leakage that facilitated regulatory change. In addition, the importance of auctioning as a policy instrument to remove windfall 118 Industry interview. 119 Commission and industry interviews. 120 Wettestad, n 5 above, 316; Business and Enterprise Committee, 'Energy Prices, Fuel Poverty and Ofgem' HC (2007-08) 293-I, at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmberr/293/293i.pdf (last visited 20 May 2010). 121 n 1 above, 26. 122 eg AEII press releases in Appendix Two below. 123 n 5 above, 317. profits may have operated as a 'force of idea'. 124 Elements of client politics' tendency for self-destruction are also visible because high-profile windfall profits and resulting higher electricity prices were bound to create a backlash.
The ETS case study matches Patashnick's three conditions for policy reform. The first condition, that policy entrepreneurs lower information costs, was present in the form of NGOs, EIIs, and the media, who explained the link between prices and windfall profits. 125 Consumers also painfully felt the impact of higher energy prices. The second condition, procedural strategies to weaken vested interests, existed as new working groups were created with greater weight given to EIIs. Finally, the third condition of tactical concessions is seen in the commission's strategy to neutralise ET opposition. In phase one, it secured the support of the largest emitting group, through free permit allocations. In phase three, it developed formulas to allocate free EUAs to EIIs and to compensate them for higher energy costs. Generators may have also adopted a lose-to-win approach by accepting auctioning because they will pass-on EUA costs to consumers and can potentially price the lost profits (from no windfall profits). 126 This strategy could also be motivated by fear of future profit regulation. 127 The ETS has clearly disrupted traditional coalitional partners and stimulated the emergence of new vested interests, for example: the EIIs that benefit from free permits, the generators that have invested heavily in abatement and can bank excess permits between phases, and the specialised businesses that provide financial services for the development and maintenance of carbon markets.
One important counter-argument to this analysis is that interest group politics may have emerged in phase one if the risk of windfall profits was widely understood. In other words, using this case study to develop theoretical shifts in Wilson's Typology is pointless (at least for a shift from client to interest group politics) because but for the misrepresentation of generators, interest group politics would have emerged in the first place. This implies phase three is simply a correction to intended equilibriums of small groups bearing both costs and benefits of regulation. As discussed above, evidence supports a case for this position, because EIIs would likely have mobilised earlier. However, this is a counter-factual argument. 128 We simply will never know whether mobilisation would have occurred. Moreover, this argument overlooks how the ETS was a new untested policy. It also minimises the important lessons to be drawn from the processes by which ET policies are initiated and reach general interest equilibriums (entrepreneurial or majoritarian politics). 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
This case study provides evidence for and adds to the sparse literature on theoretical explanations for shifts in Wilson's Typology, particularly shifts from client to interest group via entrepreneurial and finally majoritarian politics. It also demonstrates an interesting narrative that is testable against other policy reform case studies. That is, when new transparent public interest policies are proposed with interest group politics potential but majoritarian policy prescriptions, and where informational asymmetry (expertise) exists between regulated groups (or one group is more instrumental for policy institutionalisation), client politics is likely to emerge. This is likely to occur even if all groups appear to benefit equally before the policy is implemented. However, once one group realises that others have benefited more, the self-destruction process of client politics triggers a counter-mobilisation by losers. Demands for rents in the second round of rulemaking will also be met by greater resistance. This is because the reform is embedded by having already upset existing coalitional patterns and created new vested interests that understand the potential for further rent-seeking. Therefore, not only is there a return to interest group politics, but also strong indications of a tendency towards entrepreneurial or majoritarian politics as the rules begin to resemble optimal policy prescriptions. Table Three illustrates this narrative: 
Benefits of Regulation
Costs of Regulation
Concentrated Dispersed Concentrated
Interest Group Politics Client Politics
Dispersed
Entrepreneurial Politics (General Interest)
Majoritarian Politics (General Interest) WHAT PROSPECTS FOR PHASE THREE?
It is too early to predict a self-correction from past disorders. The above discussion assumes less regulatory failures in phase three; specifically that recipients of free permits will not accrue windfall profits. However, existing literature that suggests carbon leakage risks are overstated is a serious cause for concern. 130 A thorough analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is worth briefly outlining the debate here. For example, a report by Oxford Economics predicts that moving to 100 per cent auctioning with a carbon price of €25/ton will cut EU GDP by 0.5 per cent in the medium to long term. 131 A more moderate analysis by the Carbon Trust concludes that only cement, steel, and aluminium sectors are exposed. 132 Others such as the IPCC, Wooders, et al, and Mattoo, et al, believe that carbon leakage will only have minimal effects. 133 For example, Barker, Junankar, et al believe the impacts will be similar to variations in exchange rates. 134 Indeed Reinaud found no ETS impact on carbon leakage, and a recent report by Climate Strategies warns of future regulatory failures with free allocations to EIIs. 135 Other risks include the economic and political fallout of border taxes on the carbon footprints of imports to prevent carbon leakage. 136 Quantifying carbon leakage is challenging, particularly because member states will push for protecting domestic industry, and evidence is only certain once displacement occurs. 137 This is confirmed by the final list of exposed industries, which contains more than conservative prescriptions recommend. 138 Therefore, the risk of windfall profits in phase three has not disappeared; indeed it may have increased since the failure to reach a robust international agreement at Copenhagen did not trigger the review clause (of the list) in Article 10(a) of Directive Two. 139 The debate over windfall profits and carbon leakage is likely to intensify in the literature and until an international agreement is concluded. 140 A senior official at the commission recognises that carbon leakage is not 'a serious problem, but the process was highly politicized and lobbied. The best can be the enemy of the good and sufficient safeguards like strict benchmarking exist to minimize problems'. Such pragmatism and optimism in politics is normal. However, there is evidence that the benchmarking process currently underway is also subject to gaming. 141 This is a shame, because the excesses of small powerful groups at the expense of wider populations may lead to counter-excess -the potential abandonment of a useful regulatory tool (ET) for climate change mitigation.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The ETS case study provides further evidence that it is possible to escape the iron clutches of client politics. It instructs policymakers to potential ET regulatory failures, particularly in relation to free grandfathered allocations. 142 It also provides short and long-term strategies for ET institutionalisation and demonstrates the prospects for equilibriums at optimal policy prescriptions. However, as already noted, if phase three suffers from regulatory failures, the prospects for a rising phoenix may be delayed. This paper highlights important considerations for American and Australian policymakers who are currently negotiating climate change mitigation policies. Proposals for ET schemes in these countries have required only 15 per cent and ~50 per cent auctioning respectively. 143 In light of the European experience, the American figure may seem very low, but it reflects the necessary payoffs needed for long-term institutionalisation and policy learning. 144 If the ETS case study is any indication, a move towards general interest equilibriums is possible in America and Australia if policies can clear the first legislative hurdle of institutionalisation: legislation, which at this stage in both countries is uncertain. Indeed America might abandon economy-wide ET entirely in favour of a sectoral approach. 145 Finally, the analysis also contributes to the debate about regulatory failures and how, from a theoretical perspective, they are manageable by careful selection of MBIs. 146 The rise of ET was a revolution in European environmental governance. 147 This upheaval has spread because cost-effective climate mitigation tools are needed by all countries. 148 revolutions almost always fail to deliver their promises. Many optimists have become ET sceptics because its exposure to rent-seeking may outweigh any benefits. 149 In light of the result at Copenhagen the prospects for a global carbon market are quite bleak, and there have been renewed calls for a carbon tax instead, or a hybrid approach (with a carbon tax floor for EUA prices), in part because of the high levels of rent-seeking being reported in America and elsewhere. 150 However, the ETS is displaying the green shoots of a restorative order after a policy revolution. With rent-seeking potentially resolvable in the medium term, academic ink can instead address the major issue of governance and enforceability, a more serious 'Achilles Heel', if ET can emerge at a global scale. 151 
CONCLUSION
This paper sought to explain the change in EUA allocation rules between ETS phases one and three. It has shown that private interest theories, in addition to their multiple weaknesses, struggle to explain policy change without major shifts in actors' interests, particularly at client politics equilibriums. This is why the hypothesis approached the question through a different analytical frameworkWilson's Typology. It presented the argument that the shift from client politics to interest group politics best explains the change in allocation rules between phases one and three.
The ETS case study found evidence of client politics in phase one. This is because the failure of EIIs at differentiation and the resulting windfall profits of generators match Wilson's expectations of higher rent-seeking. Moreover, the change in phase three allocation rules -industry differentiation, use of benchmarking, higher levels of auctioning, and tight exceptions for EIIs -could result in lower rent-seeking, which is consistent with interest group politics expectations. One limitation remains that it is too early to tell whether carbon leakage rules are too lenient, which may undermine the expectation of long-term optimal policy equilibriums. This paper has significant practical, conceptual, and policy implications. Practically, it provides one of the first factual analyses of phase three's final directive and the first application of Wilson's Typology to both ETS legislative phases. Conceptually, the ETS case study demonstrates shifts between client and interest group politics, an area largely ignored by the literature. Despite the methodological limitations, an important theoretical lesson can be drawn: information asymmetry between lobbying groups during new, complex, and rushed policymaking can force client politics outcomes in otherwise interest group scenarios. This empirical reality can be reconciled with Wilson's Typology by understanding his idea of regulatory costs and benefits in a broader sense to include: transaction, collective action, and informational costs and benefits. From a policy perspective, useful lessons can also be drawn about the evolution of ET. Most importantly, this paper identifies the potential for ET reforms to reach longterm general interest equilibriums after false starts. This very preliminary analysis provides a framework that will hopefully be validated by future research. Global climate policy could hang in the balance. Electricity prices: Against government intervention in electricity prices that undermines the EU ETS (higher prices) and liberalisation process. Also against regulation of electricity generator profits and taxation of low-carbon generation.
APPENDIX ONE
LOBBYING POSITIONS IN BOTH ETS PHASES
Electricity prices: Favor regulating electricity prices for EIIs or offsetting CO2 passthrough costs using taxation for all sectors.
Other:
Favor abandoning the option of reduced-production as a means of lowering GHG emissions in Europe. Also favor ending distortions of the free market and preventing further unequal treatment for new entrants versus incumbents. 
Allocation:
-UNICE and IFIEC: Both unclear but preference for member state allocation -EUROPIA and OGP: Free with a preference for Community level oversight and guidelines -EUROFER and EISA: The former: favor relative targets by benchmarking and negotiated agreements at the EU level to avoid competitive distortions. The latter: in favor of auctioning -CEPI and CEPF: The former: Grandfathering based on common baseline. Targets set by negotiation, allocation by member states but with harmonisation of rules and compliance at community level. The latter: not specific. -CEMBUREAU and CERAMIE-UNIE: The latter: in favor of auctioning but unclear about EU role other than trading should be operational internationally. The former: against with EU role in harmonisation -CEFIC: Free member state allocation and based on negotiated agreements with trade associations -EUROMETAUX and EEA: No allowances, instead industry targets should be established, unclear on EU role although implicit that sectors means community level 
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